exynos-linux-stable/certs/system_keyring.c
Greg Kroah-Hartman a8c1ea6c63 This is the 4.9.126 stable release
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Merge 4.9.126 into android-4.9

Changes in 4.9.126
	net: 6lowpan: fix reserved space for single frames
	net: mac802154: tx: expand tailroom if necessary
	9p/net: Fix zero-copy path in the 9p virtio transport
	spi: davinci: fix a NULL pointer dereference
	spi: spi-fsl-dspi: Fix imprecise abort on VF500 during probe
	drm/i915/userptr: reject zero user_size
	libertas: fix suspend and resume for SDIO connected cards
	mailbox: xgene-slimpro: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
	powerpc/fadump: handle crash memory ranges array index overflow
	powerpc/pseries: Fix endianness while restoring of r3 in MCE handler.
	PCI: Add wrappers for dev_printk()
	powerpc/powernv/pci: Work around races in PCI bridge enabling
	cxl: Fix wrong comparison in cxl_adapter_context_get()
	ib_srpt: Fix a use-after-free in srpt_close_ch()
	RDMA/rxe: Set wqe->status correctly if an unexpected response is received
	fs/9p/xattr.c: catch the error of p9_client_clunk when setting xattr failed
	9p/virtio: fix off-by-one error in sg list bounds check
	net/9p/client.c: version pointer uninitialized
	net/9p/trans_fd.c: fix race-condition by flushing workqueue before the kfree()
	dm thin: stop no_space_timeout worker when switching to write-mode
	dm cache metadata: save in-core policy_hint_size to on-disk superblock
	uart: fix race between uart_put_char() and uart_shutdown()
	iio: ad9523: Fix displayed phase
	iio: ad9523: Fix return value for ad952x_store()
	vmw_balloon: fix inflation of 64-bit GFNs
	vmw_balloon: do not use 2MB without batching
	vmw_balloon: VMCI_DOORBELL_SET does not check status
	vmw_balloon: fix VMCI use when balloon built into kernel
	rtc: omap: fix potential crash on power off
	tracing: Do not call start/stop() functions when tracing_on does not change
	tracing/blktrace: Fix to allow setting same value
	uprobes: Use synchronize_rcu() not synchronize_sched()
	mfd: hi655x: Fix regmap area declared size for hi655x
	9p: fix multiple NULL-pointer-dereferences
	PM / sleep: wakeup: Fix build error caused by missing SRCU support
	KVM: VMX: fixes for vmentry_l1d_flush module parameter
	xtensa: limit offsets in __loop_cache_{all,page}
	xtensa: increase ranges in ___invalidate_{i,d}cache_all
	pnfs/blocklayout: off by one in bl_map_stripe()
	NFSv4 client live hangs after live data migration recovery
	ARM: tegra: Fix Tegra30 Cardhu PCA954x reset
	Replace magic for trusting the secondary keyring with #define
	Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot
	mm/tlb: Remove tlb_remove_table() non-concurrent condition
	iommu/vt-d: Add definitions for PFSID
	iommu/vt-d: Fix dev iotlb pfsid use
	osf_getdomainname(): use copy_to_user()
	sys: don't hold uts_sem while accessing userspace memory
	userns: move user access out of the mutex
	ubifs: Fix memory leak in lprobs self-check
	Revert "UBIFS: Fix potential integer overflow in allocation"
	ubifs: Check data node size before truncate
	ubifs: Fix synced_i_size calculation for xattr inodes
	pwm: tiehrpwm: Fix disabling of output of PWMs
	fb: fix lost console when the user unplugs a USB adapter
	udlfb: set optimal write delay
	getxattr: use correct xattr length
	libnvdimm: fix ars_status output length calculation
	printk/tracing: Do not trace printk_nmi_enter()
	bcache: release dc->writeback_lock properly in bch_writeback_thread()
	perf auxtrace: Fix queue resize
	crypto: vmx - Fix sleep-in-atomic bugs
	crypto: caam/jr - fix descriptor DMA unmapping
	fs/quota: Fix spectre gadget in do_quotactl
	Linux 4.9.126

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
2018-09-10 09:20:19 +02:00

286 lines
7.9 KiB
C

/* System trusted keyring for trusted public keys
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
static struct key *builtin_trusted_keys;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
static struct key *secondary_trusted_keys;
#endif
extern __initconst const u8 system_certificate_list[];
extern __initconst const unsigned long system_certificate_list_size;
/**
* restrict_link_to_builtin_trusted - Restrict keyring addition by built in CA
*
* Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
* being vouched for by a key in the built in system keyring.
*/
int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
const union key_payload *payload)
{
return restrict_link_by_signature(builtin_trusted_keys, type, payload);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
/**
* restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted - Restrict keyring
* addition by both builtin and secondary keyrings
*
* Restrict the addition of keys into a keyring based on the key-to-be-added
* being vouched for by a key in either the built-in or the secondary system
* keyrings.
*/
int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *type,
const union key_payload *payload)
{
/* If we have a secondary trusted keyring, then that contains a link
* through to the builtin keyring and the search will follow that link.
*/
if (type == &key_type_keyring &&
keyring == secondary_trusted_keys &&
payload == &builtin_trusted_keys->payload)
/* Allow the builtin keyring to be added to the secondary */
return 0;
return restrict_link_by_signature(secondary_trusted_keys, type, payload);
}
#endif
/*
* Create the trusted keyrings
*/
static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
{
pr_notice("Initialise system trusted keyrings\n");
builtin_trusted_keys =
keyring_alloc(".builtin_trusted_keys",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(builtin_trusted_keys))
panic("Can't allocate builtin trusted keyring\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
secondary_trusted_keys =
keyring_alloc(".secondary_trusted_keys",
KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_WRITE),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted,
NULL);
if (IS_ERR(secondary_trusted_keys))
panic("Can't allocate secondary trusted keyring\n");
if (key_link(secondary_trusted_keys, builtin_trusted_keys) < 0)
panic("Can't link trusted keyrings\n");
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Must be initialised before we try and load the keys into the keyring.
*/
device_initcall(system_trusted_keyring_init);
/*
* Load the compiled-in list of X.509 certificates.
*/
static __init int load_system_certificate_list(void)
{
key_ref_t key;
const u8 *p, *end;
size_t plen;
pr_notice("Loading compiled-in X.509 certificates\n");
p = system_certificate_list;
end = p + system_certificate_list_size;
while (p < end) {
/* Each cert begins with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE tag and must be more
* than 256 bytes in size.
*/
if (end - p < 4)
goto dodgy_cert;
if (p[0] != 0x30 &&
p[1] != 0x82)
goto dodgy_cert;
plen = (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
plen += 4;
if (plen > end - p)
goto dodgy_cert;
key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(builtin_trusted_keys, 1),
"asymmetric",
NULL,
p,
plen,
((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ),
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN |
KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION);
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
pr_err("Problem loading in-kernel X.509 certificate (%ld)\n",
PTR_ERR(key));
} else {
pr_notice("Loaded X.509 cert '%s'\n",
key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description);
key_ref_put(key);
}
p += plen;
}
return 0;
dodgy_cert:
pr_err("Problem parsing in-kernel X.509 certificate list\n");
return 0;
}
late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
/**
* verify_pkcs7_signature - Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
* @data: The data to be verified (NULL if expecting internal data).
* @len: Size of @data.
* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
* @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
* (void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
* @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
* @view_content: Callback to gain access to content.
* @ctx: Context for callback.
*/
int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len,
const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
struct key *trusted_keys,
enum key_being_used_for usage,
int (*view_content)(void *ctx,
const void *data, size_t len,
size_t asn1hdrlen),
void *ctx)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
int ret;
pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
/* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
if (data && pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
ret = -EBADMSG;
goto error;
}
ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
if (!trusted_keys) {
trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
} else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING) {
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys;
#else
trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
#endif
}
ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENOKEY)
pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
goto error;
}
if (view_content) {
size_t asn1hdrlen;
ret = pkcs7_get_content_data(pkcs7, &data, &len, &asn1hdrlen);
if (ret < 0) {
if (ret == -ENODATA)
pr_devel("PKCS#7 message does not contain data\n");
goto error;
}
ret = view_content(ctx, data, len, asn1hdrlen);
}
error:
pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);
#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
/**
* verify_signature_one - Verify a signature with keys from given keyring
* @sig: The signature to be verified
* @trusted_keys: Trusted keys to use (NULL for builtin trusted keys only,
* (void *)1UL for all trusted keys).
* @keyid: key description (not partial)
*/
int verify_signature_one(const struct public_key_signature *sig,
struct key *trusted_keys, const char *keyid)
{
key_ref_t ref;
struct key *key;
int ret;
if (!sig)
return -EBADMSG;
if (!trusted_keys) {
trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
} else if (trusted_keys == (void *)1UL) {
#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys;
#else
trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys;
#endif
}
ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(trusted_keys, 1),
&key_type_asymmetric, keyid);
if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
pr_err("Asymmetric key (%s) not found in keyring(%s)\n",
keyid, trusted_keys->description);
return -ENOKEY;
}
key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
key_put(key);
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_signature_one);