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Merge 4.9.126 into android-4.9
Changes in 4.9.126
net: 6lowpan: fix reserved space for single frames
net: mac802154: tx: expand tailroom if necessary
9p/net: Fix zero-copy path in the 9p virtio transport
spi: davinci: fix a NULL pointer dereference
spi: spi-fsl-dspi: Fix imprecise abort on VF500 during probe
drm/i915/userptr: reject zero user_size
libertas: fix suspend and resume for SDIO connected cards
mailbox: xgene-slimpro: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference
powerpc/fadump: handle crash memory ranges array index overflow
powerpc/pseries: Fix endianness while restoring of r3 in MCE handler.
PCI: Add wrappers for dev_printk()
powerpc/powernv/pci: Work around races in PCI bridge enabling
cxl: Fix wrong comparison in cxl_adapter_context_get()
ib_srpt: Fix a use-after-free in srpt_close_ch()
RDMA/rxe: Set wqe->status correctly if an unexpected response is received
fs/9p/xattr.c: catch the error of p9_client_clunk when setting xattr failed
9p/virtio: fix off-by-one error in sg list bounds check
net/9p/client.c: version pointer uninitialized
net/9p/trans_fd.c: fix race-condition by flushing workqueue before the kfree()
dm thin: stop no_space_timeout worker when switching to write-mode
dm cache metadata: save in-core policy_hint_size to on-disk superblock
uart: fix race between uart_put_char() and uart_shutdown()
iio: ad9523: Fix displayed phase
iio: ad9523: Fix return value for ad952x_store()
vmw_balloon: fix inflation of 64-bit GFNs
vmw_balloon: do not use 2MB without batching
vmw_balloon: VMCI_DOORBELL_SET does not check status
vmw_balloon: fix VMCI use when balloon built into kernel
rtc: omap: fix potential crash on power off
tracing: Do not call start/stop() functions when tracing_on does not change
tracing/blktrace: Fix to allow setting same value
uprobes: Use synchronize_rcu() not synchronize_sched()
mfd: hi655x: Fix regmap area declared size for hi655x
9p: fix multiple NULL-pointer-dereferences
PM / sleep: wakeup: Fix build error caused by missing SRCU support
KVM: VMX: fixes for vmentry_l1d_flush module parameter
xtensa: limit offsets in __loop_cache_{all,page}
xtensa: increase ranges in ___invalidate_{i,d}cache_all
pnfs/blocklayout: off by one in bl_map_stripe()
NFSv4 client live hangs after live data migration recovery
ARM: tegra: Fix Tegra30 Cardhu PCA954x reset
Replace magic for trusting the secondary keyring with #define
Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot
mm/tlb: Remove tlb_remove_table() non-concurrent condition
iommu/vt-d: Add definitions for PFSID
iommu/vt-d: Fix dev iotlb pfsid use
osf_getdomainname(): use copy_to_user()
sys: don't hold uts_sem while accessing userspace memory
userns: move user access out of the mutex
ubifs: Fix memory leak in lprobs self-check
Revert "UBIFS: Fix potential integer overflow in allocation"
ubifs: Check data node size before truncate
ubifs: Fix synced_i_size calculation for xattr inodes
pwm: tiehrpwm: Fix disabling of output of PWMs
fb: fix lost console when the user unplugs a USB adapter
udlfb: set optimal write delay
getxattr: use correct xattr length
libnvdimm: fix ars_status output length calculation
printk/tracing: Do not trace printk_nmi_enter()
bcache: release dc->writeback_lock properly in bch_writeback_thread()
perf auxtrace: Fix queue resize
crypto: vmx - Fix sleep-in-atomic bugs
crypto: caam/jr - fix descriptor DMA unmapping
fs/quota: Fix spectre gadget in do_quotactl
Linux 4.9.126
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@google.com>
commit 817aef260037f33ee0f44c17fe341323d3aebd6d upstream.
Replace the use of a magic number that indicates that verify_*_signature()
should use the secondary keyring with a symbol.
Signed-off-by: Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@sembritzki.me>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
The builtin keyring was exported prior to this which allowed
android-verity to simply lookup the key in the builtin keyring and
verify the signature of the verity metadata.
This is now broken as the kernel expects the signature to be
in pkcs#7 format (same used for module signing). Obviously, this doesn't
work with the verity metadata as we just append the raw signature in the
metadata .. sigh.
*This one time*, add an API to accept arbitrary signature and verify
that with a key from system's trusted keyring.
Bug: 72722987
Test:
$ adb push verity_fs.img /data/local/tmp/
$ adb root && adb shell
> cd /data/local/tmp
> losetup /dev/block/loop0 verity_fs.img
> dmctl create verity-fs android-verity 0 4200 Android:#7e4333f9bba00adfe0ede979e28ed1920492b40f 7:0
> mount -t ext4 /dev/block/dm-0 temp/
> cat temp/foo.txt temp/bar.txt
Change-Id: I0c14f3cb2b587b73a4c75907367769688756213e
Signed-off-by: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the
system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key
built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring.
Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more
obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys).
The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING.
If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to
.builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched
too if the secondary keyring is searched.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer
meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure.
Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to
restrict_link().
Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to
__key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to
to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not.
What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring.
Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that
point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted
keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the
trustworthiness of a new key.
With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the
trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through
one of the contained keys.
Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant
trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically
grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could
be secondarily linked.
To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source
must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the
AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data.
If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted()
resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code
still works correctly with this as it was previously using
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there
is no system keyring against which trust can be determined.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a facility whereby proposed new links to be added to a keyring can be
vetted, permitting them to be rejected if necessary. This can be used to
block public keys from which the signature cannot be verified or for which
the signature verification fails. It could also be used to provide
blacklisting.
This affects operations like add_key(), KEYCTL_LINK and KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE.
To this end:
(1) A function pointer is added to the key struct that, if set, points to
the vetting function. This is called as:
int (*restrict_link)(struct key *keyring,
const struct key_type *key_type,
unsigned long key_flags,
const union key_payload *key_payload),
where 'keyring' will be the keyring being added to, key_type and
key_payload will describe the key being added and key_flags[*] can be
AND'ed with KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED.
[*] This parameter will be removed in a later patch when
KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED is removed.
The function should return 0 to allow the link to take place or an
error (typically -ENOKEY, -ENOPKG or -EKEYREJECTED) to reject the
link.
The pointer should not be set directly, but rather should be set
through keyring_alloc().
Note that if called during add_key(), preparse is called before this
method, but a key isn't actually allocated until after this function
is called.
(2) KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION is added. This can be passed to
key_create_or_update() or key_instantiate_and_link() to bypass the
restriction check.
(3) KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY is removed. The entire contents of a keyring
with this restriction emplaced can be considered 'trustworthy' by
virtue of being in the keyring when that keyring is consulted.
(4) key_alloc() and keyring_alloc() take an extra argument that will be
used to set restrict_link in the new key. This ensures that the
pointer is set before the key is published, thus preventing a window
of unrestrictedness. Normally this argument will be NULL.
(5) As a temporary affair, keyring_restrict_trusted_only() is added. It
should be passed to keyring_alloc() as the extra argument instead of
setting KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY on a keyring. This will be replaced in
a later patch with functions that look in the appropriate places for
authoritative keys.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Make the determination of the trustworthiness of a key dependent on whether
a key that can verify it is present in the supplied ring of trusted keys
rather than whether or not the verifying key has KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED set.
verify_pkcs7_signature() will return -ENOKEY if the PKCS#7 message trust
chain cannot be verified.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content
through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside
this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key.
If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the
function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL.
The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with
verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into
linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Add KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN to convey that a key should have KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN
set rather than setting it after the fact.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Move certificate handling out of the kernel/ directory and into a certs/
directory to get all the weird stuff in one place and move the generated
signing keys into this directory.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
