2008-10-22 22:26:29 -07:00
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#ifndef _ASM_X86_ASM_H
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#define _ASM_X86_ASM_H
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2008-01-30 13:30:06 +01:00
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2008-06-16 16:08:17 -07:00
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#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
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# define __ASM_FORM(x) x
|
2013-08-29 21:13:04 +02:00
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# define __ASM_FORM_RAW(x) x
|
2011-07-19 13:00:45 +01:00
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# define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) x,
|
2008-06-16 16:08:17 -07:00
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#else
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# define __ASM_FORM(x) " " #x " "
|
2013-08-29 21:13:04 +02:00
|
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# define __ASM_FORM_RAW(x) #x
|
2011-07-19 13:00:45 +01:00
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# define __ASM_FORM_COMMA(x) " " #x ","
|
2008-06-16 16:08:17 -07:00
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#endif
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2008-01-30 13:31:26 +01:00
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x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4
commit 520a13c530aeb5f63e011d668c42db1af19ed349 upstream.
The kernel test bot (run by Xiaolong Ye) reported that the following commit:
f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
is causing double faults in a kernel compiled with GCC 4.4.
Linus subsequently diagnosed the crash pattern and the buggy commit and found that
the issue is with this code:
register unsigned int __asm_call_sp asm("esp");
#define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (__asm_call_sp)
Even on a 64-bit kernel, it's using ESP instead of RSP. That causes GCC
to produce the following bogus code:
ffffffff8147461d: 89 e0 mov %esp,%eax
ffffffff8147461f: 4c 89 f7 mov %r14,%rdi
ffffffff81474622: 4c 89 fe mov %r15,%rsi
ffffffff81474625: ba 20 00 00 00 mov $0x20,%edx
ffffffff8147462a: 89 c4 mov %eax,%esp
ffffffff8147462c: e8 bf 52 05 00 callq ffffffff814c98f0 <copy_user_generic_unrolled>
Despite the absurdity of it backing up and restoring the stack pointer
for no reason, the bug is actually the fact that it's only backing up
and restoring the lower 32 bits of the stack pointer. The upper 32 bits
are getting cleared out, corrupting the stack pointer.
So change the '__asm_call_sp' register variable to be associated with
the actual full-size stack pointer.
This also requires changing the __ASM_SEL() macro to be based on the
actual compiled arch size, rather than the CONFIG value, because
CONFIG_X86_64 compiles some files with '-m32' (e.g., realmode and vdso).
Otherwise Clang fails to build the kernel because it complains about the
use of a 64-bit register (RSP) in a 32-bit file.
Reported-and-Bisected-and-Tested-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Diagnosed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: LKP <lkp@01.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170928215826.6sdpmwtkiydiytim@treble
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-09-28 16:58:26 -05:00
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#ifndef __x86_64__
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/* 32 bit */
|
2008-06-16 16:08:17 -07:00
|
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|
# define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(a)
|
2013-08-29 21:13:04 +02:00
|
|
|
# define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(a)
|
2008-01-30 13:30:06 +01:00
|
|
|
#else
|
x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4
commit 520a13c530aeb5f63e011d668c42db1af19ed349 upstream.
The kernel test bot (run by Xiaolong Ye) reported that the following commit:
f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
is causing double faults in a kernel compiled with GCC 4.4.
Linus subsequently diagnosed the crash pattern and the buggy commit and found that
the issue is with this code:
register unsigned int __asm_call_sp asm("esp");
#define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (__asm_call_sp)
Even on a 64-bit kernel, it's using ESP instead of RSP. That causes GCC
to produce the following bogus code:
ffffffff8147461d: 89 e0 mov %esp,%eax
ffffffff8147461f: 4c 89 f7 mov %r14,%rdi
ffffffff81474622: 4c 89 fe mov %r15,%rsi
ffffffff81474625: ba 20 00 00 00 mov $0x20,%edx
ffffffff8147462a: 89 c4 mov %eax,%esp
ffffffff8147462c: e8 bf 52 05 00 callq ffffffff814c98f0 <copy_user_generic_unrolled>
Despite the absurdity of it backing up and restoring the stack pointer
for no reason, the bug is actually the fact that it's only backing up
and restoring the lower 32 bits of the stack pointer. The upper 32 bits
are getting cleared out, corrupting the stack pointer.
So change the '__asm_call_sp' register variable to be associated with
the actual full-size stack pointer.
This also requires changing the __ASM_SEL() macro to be based on the
actual compiled arch size, rather than the CONFIG value, because
CONFIG_X86_64 compiles some files with '-m32' (e.g., realmode and vdso).
Otherwise Clang fails to build the kernel because it complains about the
use of a 64-bit register (RSP) in a 32-bit file.
Reported-and-Bisected-and-Tested-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com>
Diagnosed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: LKP <lkp@01.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170928215826.6sdpmwtkiydiytim@treble
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-09-28 16:58:26 -05:00
|
|
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/* 64 bit */
|
2008-06-16 16:08:17 -07:00
|
|
|
# define __ASM_SEL(a,b) __ASM_FORM(b)
|
2013-08-29 21:13:04 +02:00
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|
# define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(b)
|
2008-06-16 16:08:17 -07:00
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|
#endif
|
2008-01-30 13:30:06 +01:00
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|
2011-07-19 12:59:51 +01:00
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#define __ASM_SIZE(inst, ...) __ASM_SEL(inst##l##__VA_ARGS__, \
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inst##q##__VA_ARGS__)
|
2013-08-29 21:13:04 +02:00
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#define __ASM_REG(reg) __ASM_SEL_RAW(e##reg, r##reg)
|
2008-01-30 13:30:06 +01:00
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2008-06-16 16:08:17 -07:00
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#define _ASM_PTR __ASM_SEL(.long, .quad)
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#define _ASM_ALIGN __ASM_SEL(.balign 4, .balign 8)
|
2008-01-30 13:31:26 +01:00
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2008-08-18 18:13:33 -07:00
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#define _ASM_MOV __ASM_SIZE(mov)
|
2008-06-16 16:08:17 -07:00
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#define _ASM_INC __ASM_SIZE(inc)
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#define _ASM_DEC __ASM_SIZE(dec)
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#define _ASM_ADD __ASM_SIZE(add)
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#define _ASM_SUB __ASM_SIZE(sub)
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#define _ASM_XADD __ASM_SIZE(xadd)
|
2017-05-01 15:47:41 -07:00
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|
#define _ASM_MUL __ASM_SIZE(mul)
|
2008-08-18 18:13:33 -07:00
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|
2008-06-24 11:37:57 -03:00
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#define _ASM_AX __ASM_REG(ax)
|
2008-06-24 17:36:31 -03:00
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#define _ASM_BX __ASM_REG(bx)
|
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#define _ASM_CX __ASM_REG(cx)
|
2008-06-24 11:37:57 -03:00
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|
#define _ASM_DX __ASM_REG(dx)
|
2008-08-18 18:13:33 -07:00
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#define _ASM_SP __ASM_REG(sp)
|
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#define _ASM_BP __ASM_REG(bp)
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#define _ASM_SI __ASM_REG(si)
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#define _ASM_DI __ASM_REG(di)
|
2008-01-30 13:30:06 +01:00
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|
|
2018-06-21 09:23:23 -07:00
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#ifndef __x86_64__
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/* 32 bit */
|
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#define _ASM_ARG1 _ASM_AX
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#define _ASM_ARG2 _ASM_DX
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#define _ASM_ARG3 _ASM_CX
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#define _ASM_ARG1L eax
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#define _ASM_ARG2L edx
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#define _ASM_ARG3L ecx
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#define _ASM_ARG1W ax
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#define _ASM_ARG2W dx
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#define _ASM_ARG3W cx
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#define _ASM_ARG1B al
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#define _ASM_ARG2B dl
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#define _ASM_ARG3B cl
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#else
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/* 64 bit */
|
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#define _ASM_ARG1 _ASM_DI
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#define _ASM_ARG2 _ASM_SI
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#define _ASM_ARG3 _ASM_DX
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#define _ASM_ARG4 _ASM_CX
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#define _ASM_ARG5 r8
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#define _ASM_ARG6 r9
|
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#define _ASM_ARG1Q rdi
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#define _ASM_ARG2Q rsi
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#define _ASM_ARG3Q rdx
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#define _ASM_ARG4Q rcx
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#define _ASM_ARG5Q r8
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#define _ASM_ARG6Q r9
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#define _ASM_ARG1L edi
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#define _ASM_ARG2L esi
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#define _ASM_ARG3L edx
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#define _ASM_ARG4L ecx
|
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#define _ASM_ARG5L r8d
|
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#define _ASM_ARG6L r9d
|
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#define _ASM_ARG1W di
|
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#define _ASM_ARG2W si
|
|
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|
#define _ASM_ARG3W dx
|
|
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|
#define _ASM_ARG4W cx
|
|
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|
#define _ASM_ARG5W r8w
|
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|
#define _ASM_ARG6W r9w
|
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#define _ASM_ARG1B dil
|
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|
#define _ASM_ARG2B sil
|
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|
#define _ASM_ARG3B dl
|
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#define _ASM_ARG4B cl
|
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#define _ASM_ARG5B r8b
|
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|
#define _ASM_ARG6B r9b
|
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|
|
#endif
|
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|
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|
2016-06-08 12:38:40 -07:00
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|
/*
|
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|
|
* Macros to generate condition code outputs from inline assembly,
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|
* The output operand must be type "bool".
|
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|
*/
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#ifdef __GCC_ASM_FLAG_OUTPUTS__
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|
# define CC_SET(c) "\n\t/* output condition code " #c "*/\n"
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|
# define CC_OUT(c) "=@cc" #c
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|
#else
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|
# define CC_SET(c) "\n\tset" #c " %[_cc_" #c "]\n"
|
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|
# define CC_OUT(c) [_cc_ ## c] "=qm"
|
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|
|
#endif
|
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|
2008-02-04 16:47:56 +01:00
|
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|
/* Exception table entry */
|
2009-08-31 11:57:20 -07:00
|
|
|
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
|
2016-02-17 10:20:12 -08:00
|
|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, handler) \
|
2012-04-20 16:57:35 -07:00
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|
.pushsection "__ex_table","a" ; \
|
2016-02-17 10:20:12 -08:00
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|
.balign 4 ; \
|
2012-04-20 17:12:48 -07:00
|
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|
.long (from) - . ; \
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|
.long (to) - . ; \
|
2016-02-17 10:20:12 -08:00
|
|
|
.long (handler) - . ; \
|
2012-04-20 16:57:35 -07:00
|
|
|
.popsection
|
|
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|
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|
2016-02-17 10:20:12 -08:00
|
|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \
|
|
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|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_default)
|
|
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|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(from, to) \
|
|
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|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_fault)
|
|
|
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|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(from, to) \
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|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_ext)
|
2014-04-17 17:17:05 +09:00
|
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|
|
locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable
performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL.
This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation
but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount
has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected,
the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow
protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back
to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow
use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely.
Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since
it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to
be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements,
and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would
be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free
conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require
the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more
common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection
provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount
overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been
rendered unexploitable:
http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/
http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016
This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero
(i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it
resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will
have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a
use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely
avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free
vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such
conditions to remain universally silent.
On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2
(which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are
produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as
changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no
notification is performed (since the value was already saturated).
On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before
0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no
overflow-only race condition.
As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction
to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount
operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon
in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction
to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by
default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch
prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable
change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path,
located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0
to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles
reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to
.text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the
error reporting routine.
Example assembly comparison:
refcount_inc() before:
.text:
ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
refcount_inc() after:
.text:
ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
ffffffff8154614d: 0f 88 80 d5 17 00 js ffffffff816c36d3
...
.text.unlikely:
ffffffff816c36d3: 48 8d 4d f4 lea -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
ffffffff816c36d7: 0f ff (bad)
These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1
to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between
unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL
(refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast):
2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s:
cycles protections
atomic_t 82249267387 none
refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero
refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero
This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t
overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based
on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks
to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this
code to be a refcount-only protection.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-15 09:19:24 -07:00
|
|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(from, to) \
|
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_refcount)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-17 17:17:05 +09:00
|
|
|
# define _ASM_NOKPROBE(entry) \
|
|
|
|
|
.pushsection "_kprobe_blacklist","aw" ; \
|
|
|
|
|
_ASM_ALIGN ; \
|
|
|
|
|
_ASM_PTR (entry); \
|
|
|
|
|
.popsection
|
2015-05-13 19:42:23 +02:00
|
|
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|
|
.macro ALIGN_DESTINATION
|
|
|
|
|
/* check for bad alignment of destination */
|
|
|
|
|
movl %edi,%ecx
|
|
|
|
|
andl $7,%ecx
|
|
|
|
|
jz 102f /* already aligned */
|
|
|
|
|
subl $8,%ecx
|
|
|
|
|
negl %ecx
|
|
|
|
|
subl %ecx,%edx
|
|
|
|
|
100: movb (%rsi),%al
|
|
|
|
|
101: movb %al,(%rdi)
|
|
|
|
|
incq %rsi
|
|
|
|
|
incq %rdi
|
|
|
|
|
decl %ecx
|
|
|
|
|
jnz 100b
|
|
|
|
|
102:
|
|
|
|
|
.section .fixup,"ax"
|
|
|
|
|
103: addl %ecx,%edx /* ecx is zerorest also */
|
|
|
|
|
jmp copy_user_handle_tail
|
|
|
|
|
.previous
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE(100b,103b)
|
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE(101b,103b)
|
|
|
|
|
.endm
|
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-31 11:57:20 -07:00
|
|
|
#else
|
2016-02-17 10:20:12 -08:00
|
|
|
# define _EXPAND_EXTABLE_HANDLE(x) #x
|
|
|
|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, handler) \
|
2012-04-20 16:57:35 -07:00
|
|
|
" .pushsection \"__ex_table\",\"a\"\n" \
|
2016-02-17 10:20:12 -08:00
|
|
|
" .balign 4\n" \
|
2012-04-20 17:12:48 -07:00
|
|
|
" .long (" #from ") - .\n" \
|
|
|
|
|
" .long (" #to ") - .\n" \
|
2016-02-17 10:20:12 -08:00
|
|
|
" .long (" _EXPAND_EXTABLE_HANDLE(handler) ") - .\n" \
|
2012-04-20 16:57:35 -07:00
|
|
|
" .popsection\n"
|
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-17 10:20:12 -08:00
|
|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE(from, to) \
|
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_default)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(from, to) \
|
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_fault)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE_EX(from, to) \
|
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_ext)
|
|
|
|
|
|
locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable
performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL.
This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation
but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount
has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected,
the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow
protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back
to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow
use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely.
Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since
it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to
be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements,
and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would
be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free
conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require
the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more
common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection
provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount
overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been
rendered unexploitable:
http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/
http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016
This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero
(i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it
resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will
have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a
use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely
avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free
vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such
conditions to remain universally silent.
On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2
(which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are
produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as
changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no
notification is performed (since the value was already saturated).
On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before
0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no
overflow-only race condition.
As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction
to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount
operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon
in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction
to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by
default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch
prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable
change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path,
located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0
to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles
reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to
.text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the
error reporting routine.
Example assembly comparison:
refcount_inc() before:
.text:
ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
refcount_inc() after:
.text:
ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp)
ffffffff8154614d: 0f 88 80 d5 17 00 js ffffffff816c36d3
...
.text.unlikely:
ffffffff816c36d3: 48 8d 4d f4 lea -0xc(%rbp),%rcx
ffffffff816c36d7: 0f ff (bad)
These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1
to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between
unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL
(refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast):
2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s:
cycles protections
atomic_t 82249267387 none
refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero
refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero
This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t
overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based
on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original
code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks
to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this
code to be a refcount-only protection.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: arozansk@redhat.com
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-08-15 09:19:24 -07:00
|
|
|
# define _ASM_EXTABLE_REFCOUNT(from, to) \
|
|
|
|
|
_ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(from, to, ex_handler_refcount)
|
|
|
|
|
|
2014-04-17 17:17:05 +09:00
|
|
|
/* For C file, we already have NOKPROBE_SYMBOL macro */
|
2009-08-31 11:57:20 -07:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2008-02-04 16:47:56 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-29 17:15:36 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
|
x86/asm: Allow again using asm.h when building for the 'bpf' clang target
[ Upstream commit ca26cffa4e4aaeb09bb9e308f95c7835cb149248 ]
Up to f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
we were able to use x86 headers to build to the 'bpf' clang target, as
done by the BPF code in tools/perf/.
With that commit, we ended up with following failure for 'perf test LLVM', this
is because "clang ... -target bpf ..." fails since 4.0 does not have bpf inline
asm support and 6.0 does not recognize the register 'esp', fix it by guarding
that part with an #ifndef __BPF__, that is defined by clang when building to
the "bpf" target.
# perf test -v LLVM
37: LLVM search and compile :
37.1: Basic BPF llvm compile :
--- start ---
test child forked, pid 25526
Kernel build dir is set to /lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
set env: KBUILD_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
unset env: KBUILD_OPTS
include option is set to -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
set env: NR_CPUS=4
set env: LINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40e00
set env: CLANG_EXEC=/usr/local/bin/clang
set env: CLANG_OPTIONS=-xc
set env: KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS= -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
set env: WORKING_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
set env: CLANG_SOURCE=-
llvm compiling command template: echo '/*
* bpf-script-example.c
* Test basic LLVM building
*/
#ifndef LINUX_VERSION_CODE
# error Need LINUX_VERSION_CODE
# error Example: for 4.2 kernel, put 'clang-opt="-DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40200" into llvm section of ~/.perfconfig'
#endif
#define BPF_ANY 0
#define BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY 2
#define BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem 1
#define BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem 2
static void *(*bpf_map_lookup_elem)(void *map, void *key) =
(void *) BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem;
static void *(*bpf_map_update_elem)(void *map, void *key, void *value, int flags) =
(void *) BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem;
struct bpf_map_def {
unsigned int type;
unsigned int key_size;
unsigned int value_size;
unsigned int max_entries;
};
#define SEC(NAME) __attribute__((section(NAME), used))
struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") flip_table = {
.type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY,
.key_size = sizeof(int),
.value_size = sizeof(int),
.max_entries = 1,
};
SEC("func=SyS_epoll_wait")
int bpf_func__SyS_epoll_wait(void *ctx)
{
int ind =0;
int *flag = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&flip_table, &ind);
int new_flag;
if (!flag)
return 0;
/* flip flag and store back */
new_flag = !*flag;
bpf_map_update_elem(&flip_table, &ind, &new_flag, BPF_ANY);
return new_flag;
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
int _version SEC("version") = LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
' | $CLANG_EXEC -D__KERNEL__ -D__NR_CPUS__=$NR_CPUS -DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=$LINUX_VERSION_CODE $CLANG_OPTIONS $KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS -Wno-unused-value -Wno-pointer-sign -working-directory $WORKING_DIR -c "$CLANG_SOURCE" -target bpf -O2 -o -
test child finished with 0
---- end ----
LLVM search and compile subtest 0: Ok
37.2: kbuild searching :
--- start ---
test child forked, pid 25950
Kernel build dir is set to /lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
set env: KBUILD_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
unset env: KBUILD_OPTS
include option is set to -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
set env: NR_CPUS=4
set env: LINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40e00
set env: CLANG_EXEC=/usr/local/bin/clang
set env: CLANG_OPTIONS=-xc
set env: KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS= -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
set env: WORKING_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
set env: CLANG_SOURCE=-
llvm compiling command template: echo '/*
* bpf-script-test-kbuild.c
* Test include from kernel header
*/
#ifndef LINUX_VERSION_CODE
# error Need LINUX_VERSION_CODE
# error Example: for 4.2 kernel, put 'clang-opt="-DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40200" into llvm section of ~/.perfconfig'
#endif
#define SEC(NAME) __attribute__((section(NAME), used))
#include <uapi/linux/fs.h>
#include <uapi/asm/ptrace.h>
SEC("func=vfs_llseek")
int bpf_func__vfs_llseek(void *ctx)
{
return 0;
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
int _version SEC("version") = LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
' | $CLANG_EXEC -D__KERNEL__ -D__NR_CPUS__=$NR_CPUS -DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=$LINUX_VERSION_CODE $CLANG_OPTIONS $KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS -Wno-unused-value -Wno-pointer-sign -working-directory $WORKING_DIR -c "$CLANG_SOURCE" -target bpf -O2 -o -
In file included from <stdin>:12:
In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h:5:
In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/compiler.h:242:
In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h:5:
In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h:10:
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:145:50: error: unknown register name 'esp' in asm
register unsigned long current_stack_pointer asm(_ASM_SP);
^
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:44:18: note: expanded from macro '_ASM_SP'
#define _ASM_SP __ASM_REG(sp)
^
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:27:32: note: expanded from macro '__ASM_REG'
#define __ASM_REG(reg) __ASM_SEL_RAW(e##reg, r##reg)
^
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:18:29: note: expanded from macro '__ASM_SEL_RAW'
# define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(a)
^
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:11:32: note: expanded from macro '__ASM_FORM_RAW'
# define __ASM_FORM_RAW(x) #x
^
<scratch space>:4:1: note: expanded from here
"esp"
^
1 error generated.
ERROR: unable to compile -
Hint: Check error message shown above.
Hint: You can also pre-compile it into .o using:
clang -target bpf -O2 -c -
with proper -I and -D options.
Failed to compile test case: 'kbuild searching'
test child finished with -1
---- end ----
LLVM search and compile subtest 1: FAILED!
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128175948.GL3298@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-04 13:08:47 -03:00
|
|
|
#ifndef __BPF__
|
2017-09-29 17:15:36 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* This output constraint should be used for any inline asm which has a "call"
|
|
|
|
|
* instruction. Otherwise the asm may be inserted before the frame pointer
|
|
|
|
|
* gets set up by the containing function. If you forget to do this, objtool
|
|
|
|
|
* may print a "call without frame pointer save/setup" warning.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
register unsigned long current_stack_pointer asm(_ASM_SP);
|
|
|
|
|
#define ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT "+r" (current_stack_pointer)
|
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
x86/asm: Allow again using asm.h when building for the 'bpf' clang target
[ Upstream commit ca26cffa4e4aaeb09bb9e308f95c7835cb149248 ]
Up to f5caf621ee35 ("x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang")
we were able to use x86 headers to build to the 'bpf' clang target, as
done by the BPF code in tools/perf/.
With that commit, we ended up with following failure for 'perf test LLVM', this
is because "clang ... -target bpf ..." fails since 4.0 does not have bpf inline
asm support and 6.0 does not recognize the register 'esp', fix it by guarding
that part with an #ifndef __BPF__, that is defined by clang when building to
the "bpf" target.
# perf test -v LLVM
37: LLVM search and compile :
37.1: Basic BPF llvm compile :
--- start ---
test child forked, pid 25526
Kernel build dir is set to /lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
set env: KBUILD_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
unset env: KBUILD_OPTS
include option is set to -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
set env: NR_CPUS=4
set env: LINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40e00
set env: CLANG_EXEC=/usr/local/bin/clang
set env: CLANG_OPTIONS=-xc
set env: KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS= -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
set env: WORKING_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
set env: CLANG_SOURCE=-
llvm compiling command template: echo '/*
* bpf-script-example.c
* Test basic LLVM building
*/
#ifndef LINUX_VERSION_CODE
# error Need LINUX_VERSION_CODE
# error Example: for 4.2 kernel, put 'clang-opt="-DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40200" into llvm section of ~/.perfconfig'
#endif
#define BPF_ANY 0
#define BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY 2
#define BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem 1
#define BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem 2
static void *(*bpf_map_lookup_elem)(void *map, void *key) =
(void *) BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem;
static void *(*bpf_map_update_elem)(void *map, void *key, void *value, int flags) =
(void *) BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem;
struct bpf_map_def {
unsigned int type;
unsigned int key_size;
unsigned int value_size;
unsigned int max_entries;
};
#define SEC(NAME) __attribute__((section(NAME), used))
struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") flip_table = {
.type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY,
.key_size = sizeof(int),
.value_size = sizeof(int),
.max_entries = 1,
};
SEC("func=SyS_epoll_wait")
int bpf_func__SyS_epoll_wait(void *ctx)
{
int ind =0;
int *flag = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&flip_table, &ind);
int new_flag;
if (!flag)
return 0;
/* flip flag and store back */
new_flag = !*flag;
bpf_map_update_elem(&flip_table, &ind, &new_flag, BPF_ANY);
return new_flag;
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
int _version SEC("version") = LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
' | $CLANG_EXEC -D__KERNEL__ -D__NR_CPUS__=$NR_CPUS -DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=$LINUX_VERSION_CODE $CLANG_OPTIONS $KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS -Wno-unused-value -Wno-pointer-sign -working-directory $WORKING_DIR -c "$CLANG_SOURCE" -target bpf -O2 -o -
test child finished with 0
---- end ----
LLVM search and compile subtest 0: Ok
37.2: kbuild searching :
--- start ---
test child forked, pid 25950
Kernel build dir is set to /lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
set env: KBUILD_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
unset env: KBUILD_OPTS
include option is set to -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
set env: NR_CPUS=4
set env: LINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40e00
set env: CLANG_EXEC=/usr/local/bin/clang
set env: CLANG_OPTIONS=-xc
set env: KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS= -nostdinc -isystem /usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-redhat-linux/7/include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include -I./arch/x86/include/generated -I/home/acme/git/linux/include -I./include -I/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi -I./arch/x86/include/generated/uapi -I/home/acme/git/linux/include/uapi -I./include/generated/uapi -include /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/kconfig.h
set env: WORKING_DIR=/lib/modules/4.14.0+/build
set env: CLANG_SOURCE=-
llvm compiling command template: echo '/*
* bpf-script-test-kbuild.c
* Test include from kernel header
*/
#ifndef LINUX_VERSION_CODE
# error Need LINUX_VERSION_CODE
# error Example: for 4.2 kernel, put 'clang-opt="-DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=0x40200" into llvm section of ~/.perfconfig'
#endif
#define SEC(NAME) __attribute__((section(NAME), used))
#include <uapi/linux/fs.h>
#include <uapi/asm/ptrace.h>
SEC("func=vfs_llseek")
int bpf_func__vfs_llseek(void *ctx)
{
return 0;
}
char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
int _version SEC("version") = LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
' | $CLANG_EXEC -D__KERNEL__ -D__NR_CPUS__=$NR_CPUS -DLINUX_VERSION_CODE=$LINUX_VERSION_CODE $CLANG_OPTIONS $KERNEL_INC_OPTIONS -Wno-unused-value -Wno-pointer-sign -working-directory $WORKING_DIR -c "$CLANG_SOURCE" -target bpf -O2 -o -
In file included from <stdin>:12:
In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h:5:
In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/include/linux/compiler.h:242:
In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h:5:
In file included from /home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/alternative.h:10:
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:145:50: error: unknown register name 'esp' in asm
register unsigned long current_stack_pointer asm(_ASM_SP);
^
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:44:18: note: expanded from macro '_ASM_SP'
#define _ASM_SP __ASM_REG(sp)
^
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:27:32: note: expanded from macro '__ASM_REG'
#define __ASM_REG(reg) __ASM_SEL_RAW(e##reg, r##reg)
^
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:18:29: note: expanded from macro '__ASM_SEL_RAW'
# define __ASM_SEL_RAW(a,b) __ASM_FORM_RAW(a)
^
/home/acme/git/linux/arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h:11:32: note: expanded from macro '__ASM_FORM_RAW'
# define __ASM_FORM_RAW(x) #x
^
<scratch space>:4:1: note: expanded from here
"esp"
^
1 error generated.
ERROR: unable to compile -
Hint: Check error message shown above.
Hint: You can also pre-compile it into .o using:
clang -target bpf -O2 -c -
with proper -I and -D options.
Failed to compile test case: 'kbuild searching'
test child finished with -1
---- end ----
LLVM search and compile subtest 1: FAILED!
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171128175948.GL3298@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-12-04 13:08:47 -03:00
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#endif
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2017-09-29 17:15:36 +03:00
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2008-10-22 22:26:29 -07:00
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#endif /* _ASM_X86_ASM_H */
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